Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 6

9-1-2011

Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an Elusive
Problem
Kami Chavis Simmons

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 18
Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 25 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol18/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive
Solutions to an Elusive Problem†
Kami Chavis Simmons∗
Table of Contents

I. Racial Profiling: The Problem of Proof ........................................ 31
A. Proving Racial Profiling: Dueling Statistics .......................... 32
B. The Difficulty Sustaining Racial Profiling Claims Based
on Equal Protection ................................................................. 37
II. The Harms of Racial Profiling ....................................................... 39
A. Racial Profiling Imposes a Racial Tax on Impacted
Individuals and Groups ........................................................... 40
B. Racial Profiling Detrimentally Impacts Minority
Communities ........................................................................... 41
C. Racial Profiling Detrimentally Impacts PoliceCitizen Partnerships................................................................. 43
III. Remedies to Eradicate Racial Profiling.......................................... 45
A. Federal and State Legislation Specifically Addressing
Racial Profiling ....................................................................... 45
B. Using DOJ’s Pattern or Practice Authority to Remedy
Racial Profiling ....................................................................... 46
Introduction
Many Americans have had interactions with police officers and other
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occur in the context of traffic stops.1 Although mildly inconvenient, traffic
stops are necessary not only for enforcing traffic rules and deterring traffic
violations, but they are generally beneficial for broader public safety
concerns. For many people, traffic stops are simply part of life. For many
racial minorities, however, especially African-American and Latino men,
even a routine traffic stop takes on an entirely different meaning.2
Historically, the relationship between racial minorities and police has been
strained, and many members of racial minority groups believe that lawenforcement officers unfairly target them because of their race or ethnicity.3
It is widely known that many Americans, especially minorities, believe that
police officers use race as a “proxy” for criminal involvement.
There is strong evidence that racial minorities believe law enforcement
officers engage in racial profiling. African-Americans have long argued
that police officers scrutinize their behavior more closely, and many report
that they are fearful of arrest even if they have done nothing illegal.4 The
majority of African-Americans believe that racial profiling is wrong, yet is
pervasive within their communities.5 The September 11th tragedy and
increased attention surrounding immigration from Mexico, however, have
caused other minority groups such as Arab-Americans and Latinos to
become increasingly concerned that law-enforcement officers also unfairly

1. See Richard R. Johnson, Citizen Expectations of Police Traffic Stop Behavior, 27
POLICING 487, 489 (2004) (“Traffic stops made up 52 percent of all police-citizen contacts in
the USA in 1999.” (citing P.A. Lanagan et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public:
Findings from 1999 National Survey, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2001))).
2. See Richard A. Fausset & P.J. Huffstutter, Black Males’ Fear of Racial Profiling
Very Real, Regardless of Class, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A16, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/25/nation/na-racial-profiling25 (reporting that many
members of racial minorities, particularly African-American males report the fear of racial
profiling, and this fear transcends age, class, and wealth) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
3. See Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities:
Innovation and Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1199 (2008) (reviewing RONALD
WEITZER & STEVEN TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM (2006))
(“Over time, whites and blacks come to view police and policing ‘in strikingly different
terms.’”). “Blacks especially are more likely than others to believe that the police are
unaccountable, abusing citizens and treating minorities harshly.” Id.
4. See KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME 26–27, 34 (1998); William J.
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (1998) (offering empirical
research supporting this proposition).
5. See RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA 83 (2006)
(noting that the “overwhelming majority of Blacks (92 percent) and Hispanics (83 percent)
believe that profiling is widespread in the United States”).
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target them based on their race or ethnicity.6 Stories of the humiliation and
helplessness of families stranded in the rain with their belongings strewn
alongside the highway are commonplace for many members of society.7
Undoubtedly, the pernicious practice of racial profiling, or at least the
perception that this practice occurs, has caused many citizens to alter their
routine to avoid the indignity of yet another police stop. Unfortunately,
there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that the perception that
police unjustly target minorities is not merely an unsubstantiated feeling,
but an uncomfortable reality.
While all forms of police misconduct or corruption are disturbing,
racial profiling occupies a unique place among such harmful practices
because it presents several unique issues that make it difficult to address
through standard police accountability measures. Society entrusts lawenforcement officers with a wide-breadth of discretion in order to perform
their everyday duties.8 While the fast-paced nature of law enforcement
necessitates discretion, if left unchecked, broad grants of discretion can lead
police officers to abuse their position and engage in misconduct ranging
from falsifying evidence, participating in violent excessive uses of force,
and engaging in racial profiling. Many forms of police misconduct and
corruption leave tangible evidence that allows law-enforcement agencies to

6. See generally, Katherine Culliton, How Racial Profiling and Other Unnecessary
Post-9/11 Anti-Immigrant Measures Have Exacerbated Long-Standing Discrimination
Against Latino Citizens and Immigrants, 8 UDC L. REV. 141, 147 (2004) (“The antiimmigrant backlash since 9/11 has severely and negatively affected Latino communities in
ways that Congress and the Administration must recognize and correct.”).
7. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s
Highways, ACLU (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Harris, Driving While Black],
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways
(last visited November 29, 2011) (providing various anecdotes of minorities stopped by the
police and how their treatment during the stop impacted their lives) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); David A. Harris, The
Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why ‘Driving While Black’ Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev.
265, 265-75 (1999) [hereinafter Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law]
(summarizing the police stop of Gerald Rossano and his 12 year-old young son Gregory,
which lasted 2 and a half hours, and during which officers terrorized the young boy with a
police dog).
8. The dissenters in Terry v. Ohio and its progeny warned that police misconduct can
almost always be characterized as allowing police discretion in performing their duties.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968). In his dissent, Justice Douglas explained, “To give the
police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.” Id.
at 38. He further noted: “Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can
pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’ him
in their discretion, we enter a new regime.” Id. at 39.
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implement remedial measures to alleviate the problem.9 Racial profiling,
however, is an elusive practice that can easily remain shrouded from view.
Racial profiling remains one of the most problematic issues within the
criminal justice system for several reasons.10 First, claims of racial
profiling are extremely difficult to substantiate using traditional measures.
The Supreme Court, in Whren v. United States,11 granted officers carte
blanche authority to conduct pretextual stops, which are completely legal
under the Fourth Amendment.12 As long as an officer has probable cause to
stop someone for one violation, the officer may use that violation as the
basis for a stop even when though the officer may have only a “hunch” that
the person is involved in other criminal activity.13 Thus, observing a car
with a broken tail light would permit officers to stop a car when the true
underlying motivation was the officer’s unsubstantiated belief that the
9. A classic example of police misconduct that leaves tangible evidence is excessive
use of force. The injuries left by an officer who uses excessive force can be seen and
recorded. In response to this type of police misconduct, many police departments use police
psychologists who conduct pre-employment screening, on the job training, and see
individual officers to help them develop the proper coping and stress management
techniques. See Ellen M. Scrivner, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONTROLLING POLICE USE OF
EXCESSIVE FORCE: THE ROLE OF THE POLICE PSYCHOLOGIST, *10-20 (1994); see also Ronald
Weitzer, Can the Police be Reformed?, CONTEXTS, Summer 2005, at 21, 25 available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~soc/docs/Weitzer/Can_the.pdf (citing some of the ways in which
forms of police misconduct or corruption could leave tangible evidence that allows for
police departments to implement remedial measures to alleviate the problem) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). Some of those methods
include recording of characteristics like race, gender, and age of all motorists during stops on
prepared forms or computer systems, mounting video cameras on the dashboards of patrol
cars to record encounters, implementing “early warning systems” using computerized
records of an officer’s complaints, civil suits, use of force and firearms, and other indicators
of questionable performance. Id.
10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RACIAL PROFILING FACT SHEET 1 (2003) available at
http://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Nov.
8, 2011) (defining racial profiling as law enforcement conduct that “rests on the erroneous
assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in
misconduct than any particular individual of other races or ethnicities”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
11. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (concluding that a stop was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the officers had probable cause to believe
that petitioners had violated the traffic code).
12. See id. at 812–13 (reviewing precedent where the Court refused to invalidate
arrests based on pretext and observing, “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”).
13. See id. at 813 (“We think these cases foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the
individual officers involved.”).
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vehicle contained drugs.14 Policies such as this do not discourage or
prevent a racially–biased officer from conducting a stop. Furthermore,
even when officers lack probable cause, the Fourth Amendment allows
police officers to conduct investigatory stops to determine whether or not
criminal activity is afoot as long as there is reasonable suspicion (a lesser
standard than probable cause) for the stop.15 Unfortunately, these highly
discretionary stops permit racial bias, either explicit or implicit, to go
unchecked and unpunished. The Court in Whren noted that any claims of
discrimination could be litigated under the Equal Protection clause.16 While
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, in
order to succeed on an Equal Protection claim, claimants have to show
intentional discrimination and, as is discussed infra, substantiating these
claims is extremely difficult (especially in light of Whren and its allowance
of race-neutral reasons to stop suspects).17
Second, racial profiling presents special problems because whether or
not authorities can “prove” racial profiling claims by traditional legal
measures, it is indisputable that many minorities rationally perceive that
they are treated unfairly.18 Whether racial profiling is real or perceived,
failing to implement measures to reduce or prevent the practice damages
the credibility of the law-enforcement agency. The perception of injustice
undermines the values of our criminal justice system.19 Ultimately, the
diminished faith in law enforcement can detrimentally impact the affected
community. Given the difficulties of proving racial profiling and the
14. See id. at 818 (“[A] traffic stop . . . is governed by the usual rule that probable
cause to believe the law has been broken ‘outbalances’ private interest in avoiding police
contact.”). “For the run-of-the-mine case, . . . probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”
Id. at 819.
15. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (holding that a police officer is entitled to
conduct limited searches of citizens when the officer believes criminal activity is afoot and
the citizen might be “armed and presently dangerous”).
16. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“But the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”).
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 5, at 83 (showing overwhelming majorities of
Blacks and Hispanics perceive widespread racial profiling).
19. See David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity As a Factor in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No. 73 MISS.
L.J. 423, 449-50 (2003) [hereinafter Harris, Using Race and Ethnicity As a Factor] (stating
that some law enforcement officers use a person’s skin color or ethnic features to make a
prediction about criminal activity); see generally, L. Darnell Weeden, Racial Profiling and
the Implications of Jena Six in Undermining the Civil Rights of Blacks In America, 36 S.U.
L. REV. 239, 240-44 (2009) (describing the use of racial profiling by police).
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inevitable harms that even the rational perception of profiling can have on a
community, finding suitable remedies is imperative.
Police agencies are generally insular entities that cultivate a culture
that can be resistant to accountability.20 Increasing transparency and
allowing the community access to information may alleviate many of the
tensions between police officers and members of these communities. This
Article argues that rather than relying on adjudicatory remedies, local lawenforcement agencies should implement proactive measures to increase
transparency with respect to internal police practices. Part I explores the
difficulty of proving racial profiling claims. Part II explores the harms of
racial profiling and argues that policymakers should shift their attention
from arguments regarding “proof” that the practice of racial profiling
persists and should instead focus on repairing the distrust that the
perception of racial profiling and similar injustices within the criminal
justice cause.
Remedying an elusive practice such as racial profiling remains a
challenging issue for the judiciary and reformers must rely on other avenues
for a solution. For example, even where evidence demonstrates that
minorities are disproportionately stopped and searched, courts rarely
recognize the victim’s claim or provide relief.21 Thus, it is clear that courts
will not be the catalysts of change. This Article argues that while courts
may be reluctant to provide judicial remedies, police departments
themselves should not ignore the perceptions and should take measures to
reduce any possible profiling and increase partnerships with communities.
An indication that a police department may be engaging in racial profiling
has a detrimental and far-reaching impact not only on the individuals who
experience it first-hand, but also on other members of the targeted
community. Ultimately, this pernicious practice threatens to undermine
legitimacy in law enforcement and the criminal justice system for large
segments of society, which impacts society as a whole. Part III concludes
by suggesting proactive remedies institutions and policymakers should
consider to alleviate the tensions between communities and police officers
20. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 455 (2004) (stating that “an overly aggressive police culture that
facilitates and rewards violent conduct” is the biggest hurdle to achieving lasting police
reform).
21. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 349–59 (2011)
(concluding that a large number of civil suits are not successful because of the barriers
presented by the current judicial remedies).
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with respect to racial profiling. Data collection efforts are imperative to
educating the public and police agencies about racial profiling, but these
efforts fall short as a long-term remedy. Therefore, in addition to data
collection during traffic stops, this Article proposes several policy solutions
that the federal government and state legislatures should implement to
address racial profiling within local law enforcement agencies.
I. Racial Profiling: The Problem of Proof
Recent examples demonstrate that police misconduct continues to
persist and is a systemic problem in many of our nation’s local police
departments. In 2011, a federal judge sentenced former Chicago police
commander Jon Burge to four-and-a-half years in jail after he was
convicted of lying to officials about widespread police misconduct by
police officers in the area under his command.22 Months later, in August
2011, a federal jury convicted several New Orleans police officers accused
of shooting unarmed citizens on Danziger Bridge in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina.23 Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Danziger Bridge case was
the widespread evidence of internal corruption that followed—several
supervising officers who arrived to investigate the shooting instead assisted

22. Annie Sweeney, Burge Given 4 ½ Years in Prison, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 21,
2011, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-burge-sentencing-0122-20110121,
0,6520153.story (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
23. Richard Fausset, Five Police Convicted in Post-Katrina Shootings, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2011, at A7 (reporting that Sergeants Kenneth Bowen, Robert Gisevius, Archie
Kaufman and Officers Anthony Villavaso and Robert Faulcon were found guilty). Five
other officers of the New Orleans Police department pled guilty to numerous charges linked
to the cover-up: Lieutenant Michael Lohman, Detective Jeffry Lehrman, and Officers
Michael Hunter, Robert Barrios, and Ignatius Hill. Sergeant Gerard Dugue faces trial in
September for his role. Id. For a detailed account of all of the charges and the officer’s
roles in the cover-up, see Ex-Cop Pleads Guilty in Katrina Bridge Shooting Cover-Up,
CNN.COM, Feb. 24, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-24/justice/katrina.cop.charges_1_
danziger-bridge-police-officers-new-orleans-police?_s=PM:CRIME (last visited Nov. 8,
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); ExPolice Officer Admits Role in Cover-Up of Louisiana Bridge Shooting, CNN.COM, Mar. 11,
2010,
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-11/justice/nopd.shooting_1_danziger-bridge-neworleans-police-ex-police?_s=PM:CRIME (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Third Officer Pleads Guilty
in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/us/08shooting.html
(last visited November 8, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
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in an elaborate plan to conceal the actions of the other officers.24 In
addition to the physical brutality these widely publicized incidents
characterize, police misconduct also includes falsification of records or
evidence, and providing false testimony in court. Racial profiling, which
the U.S. Department of Justice defines as a decision by law enforcement
that “rests on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one
race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular
individual of other races or ethnicities,” is another common practice that
plagues many police departments.25
Unlike the forms of police misconduct mentioned above, claims of
racial profiling can be difficult to substantiate. Thus, the difficulty in
detecting racial profiling and determining the extent of the practice by lawenforcement agencies nationwide presents a difficult task. There are few
instances where a police department will readily reveal an explicit policy
that encourages officers to stop individuals based on race. Similarly, it is
rare that an individual police officer will admit that the true motivation of a
traffic stop or other investigative police practice was because of the race of
the suspect. In contrast to instances of racial profiling, witnesses may
capture physical police brutality on videotape and medical professionals
can document and testify about a victim’s bruises. Occasionally, police
officers may reveal other instances of misconduct or corruption within the
police department. When tangible evidence or eyewitness reports exist,
authorities can more easily address claims of brutality and corruption. In
contrast to these instances, racial profiling remains elusive and is therefore
difficult to remedy.
A. Proving Racial Profiling: Dueling Statistics
Although the courts and the United States government have declared
that racial profiling is an illegal practice, there is a dangerous perception
among members of minority groups (particularly African-Americans and
Latinos) that law-enforcement officers unfairly target them because of their
race or ethnicity.26 The Supreme Court has clearly established that using
24. See Ex-Police Officer Admits Role in Cover-Up of Louisiana Bridge Shooting,
supra note 23, at 2 (“Lehrmann also admitted he helped compile a false report on the
incidents, and was with others when they planted a gun as part of the cover-up, according to
court documents.”).
25. U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 1.
26. See WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 5 (documenting pervasive perception among
African-Americans and Latinos that police target citizens based on race and ethnicity).
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race, ethnicity, or national origin as a proxy for criminal suspicion violates
the constitutional requirement that police and other government officials
accord to all citizens the equal protection of the law.27 Similarly, many
government officials have disavowed the use of racial profiling. For
example, former Attorney General John Ashcroft declared that “racial
profiling is an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection under our
constitution”28 and Norman Mineta, former U.S. Secretary of
Transportation, publicly decried the temptation for authorities to engage in
racial profiling.29
Despite these admonitions and decries against racial profiling, there is
a widespread perception among many citizens that racial profiling is still a
pervasive problem. Unfortunately, there is a growing body of statistical
evidence demonstrating that this “perception” of unfair treatment is an
uncomfortable reality.
Studies from various states and localities
demonstrate that police are more likely to stop African-Americans and
Latinos and are more likely to ask members of these groups for consent to
search their person or vehicle. In the late 1990s, a startling report regarding
the Maryland State Police showed that even though African-Americans
comprised only 17.5% of the drivers violating traffic laws on the road,
72.9% of all of the drivers who were stopped and searched along a portion
of Interstate 95 were African-American.30 Similarly, the New Jersey State
Police reported that 73.2% of those stopped and arrested were Black, while
only 13.5% of the cars on the road had a Black driver or passenger.31 Data
from Missouri showed that for 2000 and 2001, African-Americans were
approximately one-third more likely to be stopped as compared to the rest
of the population.32 In 2008, Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres prepared a
27. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (stating that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Thomas B. Edsall, Black Caucus,
Ashcroft Have Tense Meeting: Attorney General Cites “Candid Exchange” and Stresses
Agreement on Profiling, WASH. POST, March 1, 2001, at A6 (describing a meeting between
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and members of the Congressional Black Caucus).
28. Lizette Alvarez, Ashcroft Meets With Black Lawmakers Who Opposed His
Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2001, at A21.
29. See David A. Harris, New Approaches to Ensuring the Legitimacy of Police
Conduct: Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 73, 73 (2003) [hereinafter
Harris, New Approaches] (“Even as U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta says,
repeatedly and publicly, that there will be no racial or ethnic profiling in airport security,
those who run security operations have other ideas.”).
30. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 850 (2008).
31. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7, at 279.
32. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, The “War on Terrorism,” and Immigrants:
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report that also yielded staggering statistics.33 Ayres found that “[f]or every
10,000 [California] residents, 4,569 Blacks were stopped.34 For Whites,
only 1,750 were stopped.35 For Latinas/os, 1,773 were stopped.”36 The
same study found that Blacks who were stopped were 127% more likely
than stopped Whites to be frisked—and stopped Latinos were 43% more
likely than Whites to be frisked.37 In New York City, initiatives
implemented in the early 1990s, known as “quality of life” policing,
contributed to a disproportionate number of police stops and frisks of racial
minorities.38 Recent data demonstrate that this practice remains prevalent
within New York City where police continue to stop and frisk Blacks and
Hispanics in numbers disproportionate to their representation in the general
population. For example, in 2006, of 508,540 reported stops by New York
City police officers, 55% involved Blacks, 30% involved Hispanics, and
only 11% involved Whites.39
In the past, policymakers focused on the dearth of statistical
information related to racial profiling.40 With many states currently
gathering the data either voluntarily or because of statutory mandates, the

Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 MO. L. REV. 775, 813 (2002).
33. See Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in
the Los Angeles Police Department, ACLU OF S. CAL. 31 (2008), http://www.aclusc.org/documents/view/47 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (providing a table of statistics for the
number of stops per 10,000 residents in 942 reporting districts in Los Angeles) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Reneeh Kim, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policies: The Need
for Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 464 n.12 (2001) (“The New York State Attorney General’s
office investigation showed that blacks were six times more likely than whites to be stopped
on the street by police, and that Hispanics were over four times more likely to be stopped
than whites, during a fourteen-month period in 1998-1999.”).
39. Christopher Dunn, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: NYPD Stops and Frisks and
the Fourth Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 27, 2007, at 3. See Tim Roche & Constance
Humburg, Stops Far Too Routine for Many Blacks, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at
1A (providing other statistics involving disproportionate stops and frisks).
40. For example, Representative John Conyers (MI) proposed the Traffics Stops
Statistics Act of 1997, a federal statute that would have mandated police organizations to
collect data during every police stop, including race and whether a search was performed.
Although the legislation did not pass, it eventually prompted states to enact variations of
Conyers’s bill. See Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7 at 320–23.
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predominant issues now focus on debates about the methodology of the
data collection and what the data analysis actually shows.41
To determine whether or not an entity is engaging in racial profiling,
some researchers have compared the number of minority motorists stopped
by police with the number of minorities living in a given area.42 These
studies use census data to create a baseline for comparison against the data
related to traffic stops.43 If the percentage of minority drivers stopped is
greater than that percentage of members of that group living in the area,
some researchers view this as a strong indicator of racial profiling.44
Similarly, if the percentage of minorities stopped is lower than the
percentage of minorities in a particular area, police departments may view
this as proof that no racial profiling has occurred. Many critics of this
approach argue that the census data, which is collected only every ten years,
is outdated and does not reflect the actual percentage of minorities using the
road.45 Nor does the census data indicate whether residents or nonresidents are actually driving in an area. Critics of using census data have
argued that results may be skewed because even though someone resides in
an area, the data does not consider whether they are the legal driving age or
too old or infirm to drive.46
Skeptics offer several responses to the claims that the statistical
evidence proves that police disproportionately stop minorities. First, some
allege that the propensity for minorities to commit criminal acts accounts
for the disproportionate number of police stops.47 However, experts have
widely discredited this proposition, and studies show that even when
41. See id. at 277–88 (comparing and contrasting methods of data collections in Ohio,
New Jersey, and Maryland).
42. See Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7 at 277–88
(collecting studies from different jurisdictions).
43. See id. at 284–85 (examining how census data is gathered and used to create a
baseline).
44. See id. at 279 (“Absent some other explanation for the dramatically
disproportionate number of stops of blacks, it would appear that the race of the occupants
and/or drivers of the cars is a decisive factor or a factor with great explanatory power.”).
45. LORIE A. FRIDELL, BY THE NUMBERS: A GUIDE FOR ANALYZING RACE DATA FROM
VEHICLE STOPS 10 (2004).
46. Id. at viii.
47. See Heather MacDonald, Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2010, at A19 (arguing that “[s]uch stops happen more frequently in minority
neighborhoods because that is where the vast majority of violent crime occurs”); see also
Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, no. 2,
2004, at 131, 132 n.2 (citing empirical studies that purport to show a correlation between
membership in certain racial groups and the tendency to commit crimes).
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stopped at higher rates than non-minorities, minorities are less likely to
have contraband in the form of weapons or drugs.48 For example, one study
reported that in Highway Patrol searches of vehicles driven by nonminorities, successful “hits” for contraband occurred in 33.0% of the
searches, while only 26.3% of the searches of cars driven by AfricanAmericans revealed contraband.49 Similarly, statistics from California
show that although Blacks who had been stopped were 127% more likely to
be frisked than stopped Whites, Blacks were 25% less likely to be found
with drugs and 33% less likely to have other contraband.50 The same study
found that even though police disproportionately stopped Latinos, they too,
were less likely to have contraband than their White counterparts.51 While
some experts have found the hit rate numbers to indicate a disparity
between minorities and Whites, others researchers have found the hit rate to
be consistent, with the same percentage of stopped drivers across racial
groups yielding hits for contraband.52
There are several critiques regarding the analysis of existing racialprofiling data including a report issued by the Government Accounting
Office (“GAO”). In a 2000 report, the GAO noted that much of the data
analysis related to racial profiling “did not fully examine whether different
groups may have been at different levels of risk for being stopped because
they differed in their rates and/or severity of committing traffic
violations.”53 The GAO also stated that of the quantitative studies it
reviewed, there was a dearth of information concerning the level of
seriousness regarding the traffic violations that provided the officer with the
requisite level of suspicion or cause to stop the vehicle.54 Similarly, the

48. See, e.g., Richard L. Lundman, Driver Race, Ethnicity, and Gender and Citizen
Reports of Vehicle Searches by Police and Vehicle Search Hits: Toward a Triangulated
Scholarly Understanding, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309, 315 (2004) (discussing an
analysis of data collected by sixty-five Minnesota police departments).
49. Id.
50. M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH J. RACE & L. 109, 119
(2009).
51. Id.
52. See Chet K.W. Prager, Lies, Damned Lies, Statistics and Racial Profiling, 13 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 521 (2004) (noting that “studies in several states have revealed a
remarkable consistency: whether white or black . . . approximately 30% of police highway
searches yield contraband”).
53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-00-41, RACIAL PROFILING:
LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS 1 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/gg00041.pdf.
54. See id. at 8–11 (reviewing studies analyzing (1) motorists traveling on the New
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GAO reported that “missing” data from the comparison groups may have
skewed results.55
Despite these critiques, information collection on traffic stops can be
integral to creating much-needed transparency in law enforcement.
Furthermore, commentators recently have argued that there have been
marked improvements in the data collection and analysis related to racial
profiling, and that researchers have remedied many of the limitations of
previous studies.56 Continually improving upon the data collection methods
and analysis will help policymakers determine what, if any, measures are
necessary to combat racial profiling.
B. The Difficulty Sustaining Racial Profiling Claims Based on Equal
Protection
Compared to other forms of police misconduct, racial profiling is
difficult to prove under current standards. The difficulty in substantiating
the existence of racial profiling, and the emphasis policy makers have
placed on proving its existence, has made it difficult to implement remedial
measures. Unlike physical police brutality which can be proved though
tangible evidence (photos, medical reports, or eyewitness testimony) or
other instances of corruption, racial profiling is far more difficult to
substantiate, and may be nearly impossible to prove in a court of law. In
the case of Wilkins v. Maryland State Police,57 one of the most famous
successful racial profiling suits, a rare “smoking gun,” tangible evidentiary
proof of a policy of racial profiling, likely prompted settlement.58 In this
case, Maryland State Police files actually revealed a written memorandum
Jersey Turnpike—one by researcher J.L. Lamberth and another by the New Jersey State
Police; (2) a study along Interstate 95 in Maryland; (3) stops of motorists in Florida; and (4)
an ACLU report on motorists in Philadelphia).
55. See id. at 11 (discussing the significance of the limitations of the available
analyses).
56. See Melisa Whitney, Note, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Traffic
Stops and Searches: Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49
B.C. L. REV. 263, 287–88 (2008) (discussing the increased quality of data collection related
to racial profiling).
57. For a more complete discussion of Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, see David A.
Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 563-66 (1977).
58. See Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7 at 280 (describing
the Maryland State Police settlement with Robert Wilkins after discovery revealed an
internal police memo instructing troopers to target “black males and black females”).
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that set forth a criminal profile explicitly based on race.59 Despite the
statistics showing the disproportionate stops and searches of minorities, in
most instances, victims of racial profiling will not be able to produce these
“smoking” memoranda. Ironically, without this crucial evidence of
purposeful discrimination, courts will likely bar equal protection claims
because plaintiffs have failed to show that the police officers intentionally
discriminated against them.60
Several courts have refused to grant relief despite evidence of
disproportionate traffic stops of minorities. For example, in United States
v. Avery,61 the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant’s equal protection claim
could not be sustained, and rejected statistics showing that police
disproportionately targeted African-Americans because the officers had a
plausible, non-racial reason for detaining the defendant.62 Similarly, in
Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach,63 the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment because appellant failed to provide evidence to refute the officer’s
race neutral explanation for the traffic stop.64 The Eighth Circuit reached a
similar result in Johnson v. Crooks,65 where the court denied relief because
the plaintiff could not provide affirmative evidence of the discriminatory
reason for a traffic stop.66 Given the constitutional framework of Equal
Protection claims and these perverse results, David Harris has noted that
racial profiling is “one of those abhorrent creatures that the law
prohibits . . . a practice, that if proven, will bring the legal equivalent of
lightning bolts hurled by Zeus down on the perpetrators.”67 Unsurprisingly,

59. See id. n.85 (citing Armed Drug Traffickers in Allegany County, Maryland: Police
Officer Safety, CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Md. State Police, Apr. 27, 1992)).
60. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (stating that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
61. United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997).
62. See id. at 353 (rejecting the defendant’s equal protection claim because the officers
had a reasonable explanation for the stop).
63. Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2003).
64. See id. at 731–32 (affirming summary judgment because appellant failed to
provide sufficient evidence to counter the officer’s testimony that the traffic stop was not
motivated by appellant’s race); see also Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999–1000 (8th
Cir. 2003) (denying relief because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of discrimination to
counter the officer’s race-neutral justification of the traffic stop).
65. Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 999–1000 (denying the plaintiff’s claim that she was stopped due to racial
profiling because she did not have affirmative evidence).
67. Harris, New Approaches, supra note 29, at 75.

BEGINNING TO END RACIAL PROFILING

39

there is widespread consensus that courts have been “largely ineffective in
the battle against profiling.”68
Furthermore, racial profiling remains elusive and difficult to remediate
because, even in the absence of intentional forms of discrimination,
individual officers may be motivated by their unconscious racial biases.
Despite much progress on racial issues, racial discrimination is not a “relic
of the past” but instead remains a contemporary feature of modern
society.69 Today, overt displays of discrimination are rare, but racial
prejudice “often goes unrecognized even by the individual who responds
unconsciously to such motivation.”70 For example, several psychological
studies testing implicit bias demonstrate that images of African-Americans
evoke more fear than other groups and confirm that members of minority
groups, particularly African-American males, are associated with
aggressive behavior.71
Whether or not there is definitive proof of discrimination, it is
indisputable that many members of minority groups perceive that many
police officers harbor and exercise racial animus when policing
communities of color.72 This perception itself can be damaging to the
credibility and legitimacy of a law-enforcement agency.
II. The Harms of Racial Profiling
Even assuming statistical evidence of racial profiling is inconclusive
and courts fail to find intentional discrimination, these facts have little
68. Id.
69. See Seth Kotch & Robert Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle
With Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2102 (2010)
(discussing the importance of unconscious racial motivation in death penalty sentencing).
70. Id.
71. See generally Catherine A. Cottrell & Steven L. Neuberg, Different Emotional
Reactions to Different Groups: A Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to Prejudice, 88
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 770 (2005) (discussing studies of the connection of racial
images and bias).
72. See Wesley G. Skogan, Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Police-Community
Relations in a Majority-Black City, 45 J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 398, 398–428
(2008)
available
at
http://www.gwu.edu/~soc/docs/Weitzer/Police_Community.pdf
(describing perception of police misconduct); Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in
the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73
S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1226 (2000) (noting that, “[w]hile needing protection from crime,
many distrust the police and see their order-maintenance efforts as bullying and fear
producing”).
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practical impact for certain individuals or the police officers who work
within those communities to keep residents safe. With or without the
imprimatur of a court decision, it is indisputable that many members of
minority groups perceive an injustice, and this perception is dangerous and
harmful to both the community and law enforcement. Even the perception
that certain groups are treated unfairly undermines the legitimacy of the law
enforcement agency, and thus has a deleterious effect on crime control and
prevention.73
A. Racial Profiling Imposes a Racial Tax on Impacted Individuals and
Groups
Racial profiling leads to the societal stigmatization of victims known
as a “racial tax.”74 Both the individual and the targeted community as a
whole suffer psychological and emotional harms of racial profiling. Casual
observers may view multiple police stops as a mere inconvenience, but in
reality this “mere inconvenience” is really a harsh form of social
stigmatization. Those who become targets of racial profiling suffer the
emotional and psychological burden of racial profiling, and some members
of minority groups have reported psychological harms of humiliation and
depression as a result of racial profiling.75
The “broad taint of suspected criminality”76 that burdens the entire
ethnic or racial group that has been profiled, has been referred to as a
“racial tax.”77 Randall Kennedy, a professor at Harvard Law School,
73. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler, & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a
Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 335, 347 (“When perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy decline,
people’s willingness to obey also declines, but when authorities build their legitimacy,
people are more willing to comply with the law.”).
74. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
163, 213–14 (2002) (noting that Professor Randall Kennedy popularized the term “racial
tax”).
75. Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 15–16 (2003) (discussing minority right to respect); AMNESTY INT’L,
Threat and Humiliation: Racial Profiling, Domestic Security, and Human Rights in the
United States xiv (2004) [hereinafter Threat and Humiliation], available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/report/rp_report.pdf (noting that AfricanAmericans have reported various emotional harms of racial profiling).
76. See Harris, Using Race and Ethnicity As a Factor, supra note 19, at 454.
77. See Alschuler, supra note 74, at 213–18 (explaining the definition of a “racial
tax”).
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widely publicized this term, which is used to describe the additional
burdens placed upon African-American, Arabic, Latino and Asian
minorities for their membership within their specific race/ethnic group.78
The “tax” has a particularly acute impact upon those of Latino descent,
since they are often forced to prove their citizenship in addition to suffering
the injustice of racial profiling.79 Officers create an environment where
Latinos are “cast as foreigners,” and those of the working class in emerging
Latino communities are questioned more often since they might bear a
resemblance to the “stereotypical image of what illegal immigrants
supposedly look like.”80 Because a large majority of Latinos live in the
United States are citizens or legal immigrants, this means that legal and
lawful residents unjustly bear the burden of these “citizenship
encounters.”81 Each of these forms of racial taxation unduly burdens the
targeted group, for no other reason than a person’s membership to that
group.82
B. Racial Profiling Detrimentally Impacts Minority Communities
In addition to the unjust burdens racial profiling places on
minorities, racial profiling implicates several broader societal
problems. First, pervasive racial profiling is one factor that may lead
to higher incarceration rates among racial minorities.83 Despite
significant progress in the sphere of race relations, members of racial
minority groups are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.84
78. See id. (“Randall Kennedy observes that a Latino stopped at an immigration
checkpoint is made to pay a type of racial tax for the campaign against illegal immigration
that whites, blacks, and Asians escape.”).
79. See Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial
Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 20 (2005) (noting
that Latinos bear a double-burden by shouldering both a criminal and an illegal immigrant
stigma).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. (discussing the burdens placed upon Latinos as a result of racial taxation).
83. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation
in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 344 (2003)
(discussing how a higher percentage of traffic stops of minorities may be correlated to the
higher percentage of minorities in prison).
84. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK 75–76 (2002) (noting that Blacks and Latinos are disproportionately arrested and
incarcerated).
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Targeting specific groups for stops, searches, and arrests is linked to
increased incarceration rates of those belonging to the targeted
groups.85
One example involves targeting African-Americans,
specifically African-American males, in the investigation and
prosecution of drug crimes.86 Even if the racial profiling of AfricanAmerican males for drug crimes leads to the arrest of guilty
individuals, innocent members of these minority communities still
suffer.87 The overrepresentation of racial minorities in the criminal
justice system should prompt policymakers to carefully scrutinize the
earliest interactions between police and racial minorities. It is within
these crucial early stages of investigation that racial profiling is likely
to occur.
High incarceration rates exacerbate the overall harm to the
community because those who are incarcerated come from the “same
racially
isolated
and
socioeconomically
disadvantaged
neighborhoods.”88 By losing a number of the adults from an already
disadvantaged area, the community and children suffer without adult
members of their society. 89 In addition, those that return to their
community bring with them emotional and psychological effects from
the brutality of prison life.90 The families of those sent to prison also
85. See id. (noting the consequences of targeting a specific group for law enforcement
purposes).
86. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the Drug War, 56
STAN. L. REV. 571, 594–96 (2003) (examining instances of police profiling of AfricanAmerican males for such crimes). Banks goes on to note:
During the past quarter century, aggregate increases in incarceration, coupled
with growing racial disparities, have resulted in staggering and unprecedented
levels of incarceration for black men in particular. A recent study by the Bureau
of Justice Statistics found that in 2001 nearly seventeen percent of black men
were currently or previously imprisoned. Black men are more than five times as
likely as white men to enter prison . . . . These disparities have grown
dramatically in recent years. While a variety of factors account for these
developments, the importance of the drug war is beyond dispute.
Id.
87. See id. (“Such distributive injustice is reinforced to the extent that, as the
following discussion suggests, the incarceration of the guilty also indirectly burdens the
innocent.”).
88. Id. at 596; see also D. J. Silton, U.S. Prisons and Racial Profiling: A Covertly
Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53, 54 (2002) (describing the
devastating cycle that racially disparate incarceration and sentencing creates).
89. See Banks, supra note 86, at 596 (“The families of inmates lose the social and
economic support that the person might otherwise have provided.”).
90. See id. (stating that adults may have trouble with reentry into the community after
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suffer, emotionally and economically.91 Many families often lose their
primary breadwinner, and the organization of the familial structure can
be destabilized.92 If pervasive and unjust racial profiling can be
remediated, this may ease some of the economic, political,
sociological, and familial harms felt across minority communities that
suffer from higher incarceration rates.93
C. Racial Profiling Detrimentally Impacts Police-Citizen Partnerships
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the perception that certain
groups are treated unfairly undermines the legitimacy of the law
enforcement agency, and thus has a deleterious effect on crime control
and prevention.94 Many members of minority communities are also
disproportionately victims of crime and may live in areas that
experience higher rates of crime.95 For example, in many large urban
areas, a disproportionate number of crime victims are AfricanAmerican, and thus partnerships between citizens and police are
essential to crime prevention.96 As one scholar noted, “[T]here is a
causal link between the perception of the law and levels of compliance.
Unfortunately, the perception in many poor and minority communities
is that the law, as exemplified by the police, is illegitimate, a
perception that encourages non-compliance.”97
It follows that areas in need of the greatest amount of law
enforcement protection are also likely to have a large proportion of
residents who distrust law enforcement.
Racial profiling also
exacerbates tensions between racial minorities and law enforcement,
having endured the conditions of prison).
91. See id. (stating that families lose the social and economic support of the
imprisoned family member).
92. See id. (“The organization and stability of families may be undermined.”).
93. See id. (discussing the social harms of incarceration).
94. See Harris, New Approaches, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that “[w]hen one
segment of society is seen as unfairly targeted or persecuted by the system, the system itself
loses legitimacy—not just in the eyes of those on the receiving end of the abusive treatment,
but also in the eyes of all citizens”).
95. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword: Loyalty and Criminal Justice, 49 HOW. L.J.
405, 413-14 (2006) (noting that in large cities, African-Americans represent a “hugely
disproportionate” number of victims).
96. See id (stating that the hugely disproportionate number of African-American crime
victims has negatively impacted many African-American communities).
97. Capers, supra note 30, at 842.
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and undermines the rationale for community policing. Thus, efforts to
engage these citizens in crime prevention partnerships with law
enforcement face challenges that may not be present in other
communities. David Harris also notes that racial profiling can have a
negative impact on the way in which minority groups view law
enforcement. Harris writes, “Racially targeted traffic stops cause deep
cynicism among blacks about the fairness and legitimacy of law
enforcement and courts . . . . Thus it is no wonder that Blacks view the
criminal justice system in totally different terms than whites do.”98 For
example, San Diego Police Chief Jerome Sanders and the San Diego
Police Department voiced concerned that the “growing public
perception that police target minority drivers [] was ‘eroding public
trust and need[ed] to be addressed if community policing . . . [was] []
to be successful.’”99
Not only is racial profiling harmful to individuals and
communities, but, as previously discussed, there is evidence
demonstrating that racial profiling is an ineffective law-enforcement
tool. Despite the disproportionate number of stops and searches of
African-Americans and Latinos, studies show that when searched,
these groups were less likely than Whites to have contraband. 100
Together, these facts confirm not only the existence of racial profiling,
but that racial profiling is an ineffective tool for law enforcement
whose costs outweigh any negligible benefit. Given these societal
costs, innovative solutions are required to address racial profiling.
98. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7, at 298.
99. David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the
“New Federalism” in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 389 n.
157 (2001). Thus, to prevent the tensions associated with the perception from racial
profiling from undermining the gains he had made in community policing, Sanders decided
that the San Diego Police Department would “become the first major city police department
to begin collecting traffic stop data on its own initiative, without any federal or state
mandate.” Id. at 389.
100. See Capers, supra note 30, at 850 (providing statistics showing that although
Blacks and Hispanics were stopped more, Whites were found with evidence of criminal
activity more often); see also Darmer, supra note 50, at 119 (discussing the unique problems
involved in teaching racial profiling issues in racially homogeneous classrooms). Darmer
stated:
Although stopped Blacks [in California] were 127% more likely to be frisked
than stopped Whites, they were 42.3% less likely to be found with a weapon
after they were frisked, 25% less likely to be found with drugs and 33% less
likely to be found with other contraband. We found similar patterns for Latinos.
Id.
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III. Remedies to Eradicate Racial Profiling
A. Federal and State Legislation Specifically Addressing Racial Profiling
There are several possible measures that policymakers could
implement to address racial profiling at both the national and local levels.
The almost insurmountable legal standards and the difficulty in sustaining
Equal Protection claims, suggests that reliance on judicial remedies is illadvised. Alternatively, legislative efforts, may offer a more promising
strategy to address racial profiling. For many years, Representative John
Conyers and others in Congress have been working to pass federal
legislation that would address racial profiling. Conyers first proposed the
Traffic Stops Statistics Act in 1997, but efforts to pass this legislation
failed.101 Then in 2001, Conyers introduced a more comprehensive End
Racial Profiling Act of 2001.102 Despite wide bi-partisan support, this Act
also failed to pass but was reintroduced in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, and
2010. The End Racial Profiling Act of 2011 was introduced again in 2011
and proponents are anxiously awaiting the bill’s fate. The End Racial
Profiling Act would prohibit and attempt to eliminate racial profiling by
federal, state, local, and tribal law-enforcement agencies and would allow
the federal government or private plaintiffs to sue for declaratory or
injunctive relief.103 Furthermore, if enacted, the law would authorize the
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to provide grants for “the
development and implementation of best policing practices, such as, early

101. See Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring
data to be collected during all traffic stops for trend analysis); see also Traffic Stops
Statistics Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring officers to collect data
during all traffic stops for subsequent trend analysis).
102. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001) (expanding
the aim of Congressman’s Conyers proposed legislation).
103. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2010, H.R. 5748, 112th Cong. (2010) (refining a
definition of racial profiling). The proposed legislation states:
[T]he practice of a law enforcement agent or agency relying, to any degree, on
race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion in selecting which individual to
subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory activities or in deciding upon the
scope and substance of law enforcement activity following the initial
investigatory procedure, except when there is trustworthy information, relevant
to the locality and timeframe, that links a person of a particular race, ethnicity,
national origin, or religion to an identified criminal incident or scheme.
Id.
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warning tracking systems, technology integration, and other management
protocols that discourage profiling.”104
Many groups, including the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties Union, have lobbied
Congress to pass the federal legislation that specifically prohibits racial
profiling.105 Despite these efforts, Congress has repeatedly failed to pass
the End Racial Profiling Act. Perhaps one positive externality of these
repeated, yet unsuccessful efforts to pass federal legislation is that many
states have passed their own legislation aimed at addressing racial
profiling.106 More than half of the nation’s states have enacted legislation
either prohibiting racial profiling and/or requiring jurisdictions within the
state to collect data on law enforcement stops and searches.107 Even many
states that do not statutorily prohibit racial profiling have made voluntary
efforts to collect information related to race and traffic.108
B. Using DOJ’s Pattern or Practice Authority to Remedy Racial Profiling
Much of the contemporary debate related to racial profiling focuses
upon whether definitive proof exists regarding an officer’s intentional
discrimination or whether an agency has a policy or custom of racial
profiling.109 It is unlikely that an officer will admit his or her bias or that an
agency will produce their racially-biased policy, thus making definitive
proof of profiling difficult to ascertain. A more effective strategy to
104. 156 CONG. REC. E1341-02 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (Statement of Rep. John
Conyers).
105. Press Release, ACLU, Forum Calls on Congress and Administration to End Racial
Profiling: ACLU Hosts Event to Stop Discrimination (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/three_faces_merged_document.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Press Release, NAACP,
NAACP-Supported End Racial Profiling Act Introduced in the U.S. Senate (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://www.naacp.org/action-alerts/entry/naacp-supported-end-racial-profiling-actintroduced-in-the-u.s.-senate (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
106. Data Collection Resource Center at Northeastern University, Legislation and
Litigation, http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/legislation/ (last visited November 8,
2011) (describing legislation passed by different states to end racial profiling) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Darmer, supra note 50, at 114–18 (recalling Whren and subsequent cases that
hold an officer’s subjective belief is not a relevant inquiry for reviewing the propriety of a
stop).
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address racial profiling involves ameliorating systemic policies and
practices that encourage or tolerate racial profiling and to assist the police
department in implementing practices that will rehabilitate minority’s
confidence in the police department. It is now widely accepted among
scholars that much police misconduct is attributable to an organizational
culture within law enforcement agencies that “cultivates or tolerates” police
misbehavior.110 Experts have agreed that adjudicatory remedies that are
focused on the past misconduct of individual officers are largely
ineffective, and that the best way to address police misconduct is to
implement proactive practices that encourage broader institutional
changes.111 For example, the Christopher Commission, which examined the
Los Angeles Police Department after the infamous police beating of
Rodney King, found that a small number of officers within a police
department were responsible for the majority of complaints.112 Therefore,
many experts theorize that identifying, monitoring, re-training, or
disciplining “problem” officers is likely to lead to the greatest reduction in
misconduct.113 Civil rights suits against officers and municipalities, internal
investigations, and citizen-complaint review boards are all tools to address
police misconduct. These tools, however, are reactionary and are only
utilized to remedy previous, discrete instances of misconduct. It is clear
that these adjudicatory measures are inadequate to change the culture of a
police department that engages in racial profiling or other systemic issues
of misconduct.
An institutional culture that encourages or tolerates racial profiling
necessitates an institutional remedy. One of the most promising models to
remedy systemic police misconduct is the DOJ’s “pattern or practice”
authority, which the federal government has used to implement systemic
reforms within several local police departments nationwide. In 1994,
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a statute that seeks to address the
policies and practices of a police agency, and has shown great promise in
110. See generally Armacost, supra note 20, at 457.
111. See Harris, New Approaches, supra note 29 at 85–87 (describing police
departments independently enacting proactive policies).
112. See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT ix–xi (1991), http://www.parc.
info/client_files/Special%20Reports/1%20-%20Chistopher%20Commision.pdf (last visited
Nov. 8, 2011) (explaining the findings of the Christopher Commission) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
113. See Armacost, supra note 20, at 532 (noting that scholars have concluded that “a
focus on re-mediation and retraining rather than increasingly punitive sanctions may actually
lead to more certain and lasting reform”).
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spurring institutional reforms in several local law-enforcement agencies.114
Pursuant to its “pattern or practice” authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the
DOJ has required several police departments nationwide, including the Los
Angeles Police Department and the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department, to reform their policies and practices.115 Section 14141
grants the U.S. government the authority to sue for injunctive relief to
change policies within a local police department where DOJ has found a
pattern or practice of constitutional violations.116 Generally, the resulting
consent decrees or agreements have included reforms of both substantive
and procedural policies to create more transparency and ensure
accountability.117 One reform includes modifying use of force policies to
provide guidelines regarding what type of force is appropriate in
apprehending a suspect and defining or limiting circumstances when certain
uses of force are appropriate.118 Another common reform DOJ has required
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006) (authorizing the Attorney General to conduct
investigations and, if warranted, file civil litigation to eliminate a “pattern or practice of
conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States”).
115. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Agreement to
Resolve Police Misconduct Case Against Columbus Police Department (Sept. 4, 2002),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/September/02_crt_503.htm (“Today’s agreement is the
eighth settlement under the 1994 Crime Bill.”). “Other settlements entered during the Bush
Administration include the Cincinnati Police Department, the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department and the Highland Park, Illinois Police Department.” Id.
Additionally, “[t]he Justice Department continues to monitor settlements covering the Los
Angeles Police Department, the New Jersey State Police, the Steubenville, Ohio Police
Department and the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.” Id.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (2006) (“[T]he Attorney General, for or in the name of
the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to
eliminate the practice.”).
117. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and the City of Mt.
Prospect, Illinois 3 (Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
mtprospect_moa.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (listing the different procedures the police
department was required to implement pursuant to the written policy) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
118. Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief, Special Litigation Section, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Subodh Chandra, Director, Dep’t of Law, City of Cleveland 1 (Feb. 9, 2004),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cleveland_uof_final.pdf
(agreement required the modification of the use of force policy, including prohibiting
officers from “intentionally firing at moving vehicles unless there is imminent danger of
death or serious injury, and other means are not available to avert or eliminate the threat,
and, where feasible, some warning has been given”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Justice Department Reaches Agreement with Buffalo Police Department to Resolve Police
Misconduct Investigation (Sep. 19, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/September/
02_crt_535.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (agreement required the modification of the use
of force policy specifically for the use of chemical sprays by implementing a new policy, but
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is the implementation of an early-warning tracking system to help
supervisors identify officers who might need to be re-trained or
disciplined.119 Collecting this type of information and using it to make
training and personnel decisions may deter the intentional wrongdoing of
individual officers. Yet another reform is the implementation of fair and
comprehensive complaint processes for citizens who wish to report alleged
misconduct.120 Many citizens, especially minorities, are reluctant to file
complaints against police officers because they simply believe that their
complaints will not be fairly processed. To ensure fairness and reduce the
possibility for retaliation, officers assigned to investigate citizen complaints
should be sufficiently independent from the officers they are investigating.
Notably, DOJ has also required several jurisdictions to compile information
related to racial profiling.121 Compiling and publishing information related
also required the police department to revise general use of force policies and procedures for
reporting all uses of force) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice); Memorandum of Agreement, United States Department of Justice and the
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (Jun. 13,
2001), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcmoa.php (last visited Nov. 29,
2011) (the agreement required the police department to implement general use of force
policy modifications that emphasized de-escalation procedures, such as advisements,
warnings, and verbal persuasion, as well as specific modifications regarding the use of
firearms, canines, Oleoresin Capsicum Spray) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
119. United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769 GAF (RCx) (C.D. Cal.)
(Order Re:
Transition Agreement), at 5–7, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/US_v_LosAngeles_TA-Order_071709.pdf (mandating the continued use of a
Training, Evaluation, and Management System (“TEAMS II”) “in the manner in which it
was intended—an early warning or risk management system”); Memorandum of Agreement
Between the United States Department of Justice and the City of Buffalo, New York and the
Buffalo Police Department, the Police Benevolent Association, Inc., and the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Local 264, at 5–6, ¶¶ 20–23 (Sep. 19,
2002), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NY-0004-0001.pdf (requiring the
creation of a management and supervision system for tracking excessive use of force
incidents and complaints and using them to correct police officer conduct through evaluation
and training, akin to an “early warning system”); Memorandum of Agreement, United States
Department of Justice and the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department, at Section I(a)(2) (Jun. 13, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/spl/documents/dcmoa.php (“[T]he Department of Justice has provided MPD with
on-going technical assistance recommendations regarding its use of force policies and
procedures, training, investigations, complaint handling, canine program, an early warning
tracking system. Based upon these recommendations, MPD has begun to implement
necessary reforms in the manner in which it investigates, monitors, and manages use of force
issues.”).
120. See Memorandum of Agreement supra note 117, at 7 (describing the complaint
process available to citizens).
121. Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center at Northeastern University,
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to race and traffic stops and searches may help jurisdictions determine
whether officers are disproportionately stopping racial minorities. With
vigorous enforcement, DOJ’s pattern or practice authority could lead to
reforms that will ultimately address many of the systemic issues
contributing to tension between minorities and the police.
Several of the agreements and consent decrees that DOJ has entered
with local departments have explicitly contained provisions to alleviate
racial profiling.122 DOJ required in its agreements with police departments
in Prince George’s County, Maryland, Mt. Prospect, Illinois, and the State
of New Jersey that these entities implement measures to eradicate racial
profiling. For example, in its agreement with the Mt. Prospect Police
Department, the police department was required to develop and implement
the following: a written policy against discrimination in policing, including
nondiscrimination in conducting traffic stops; documentation of all traffic
stops by recording the driver’s race, ethnic origin, and gender; the reason
for the stop and the nature of any post-stop actions; improved supervisory
review of traffic stops and other police enforcement practices; a community
outreach and information program, under which officers will give their
names and the reason for a traffic stop at the outset of the stop and provide
complaint forms in English or Spanish to persons who object to an officer’s
conduct; increased training regarding nondiscrimination, interpersonal
communications, cultural diversity, and ethics; and provide semi-annual
public reports providing traffic stop statistics by race and summary
information on complaint investigations.123
Legislation and Litigation—DOJ Investigations, http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.
neu.edu/legislation/doj.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (summarizing several U.S.
Department of Justice investigations against police departments in Cincinnati, Buffalo,
Columbus, L.A., Pittsburgh, D.C., Highland Park, Montgomery County, the State of New
Jersey, and the Village of Mount Prospect that involved investigation for racial profiling and
requiring those police departments to collect data regarding racial profiling) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
122. See In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 395 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (describing a
Collaborative Agreement that was written to serve this purpose); see also Memorandum of
Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City of Cincinnati,
Ohio and the Cincinnati Police Dep’t 2 (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/spl/documents/cincinnati_pd_amend_agree_7-25-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2011)
(stating that the parties resolved an alleged pattern or practice of excessive force through a
Memorandum of Agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
123. Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and the City of Mt.
Prospect, Illinois 3 (Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
mtprospect_moa.pdf (listing the different procedures the police department was required to
implement pursuant to the written policy).
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DOJ’s pattern or practice authority becomes increasingly relevant in
the struggle to combat racial profiling for several reasons. First, while
some states have passed revolutionary legislation to address racial profiling,
the legislative requirements regarding data and other measures to combat
profiling vary widely.124 Without comprehensive federal legislation that
124. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-2-117 (West 2011) (prohibiting peace officers
from engaging in racial profiling). The Montana statute also requires:
law enforcement agencies to adopt a policy on race-based traffic stops
prohibiting the use of race as a pretext for investigation, provides for periodic
reviews and collection of data to assess patterns of racial profiling, and
authorizes investigations when patterns emerge; that all stops be documented to
gather information to be used in assessing violations of racial profiling; state law
enforcement agencies to create a detailed written policy that the agency will use
to address written complaints of racial profiling, which must include prompt
review, a designated person to carry out reviews, acknowledge receipt of
complaints within ten days, and report the results of the review to the
complainant; cultural awareness training and training in racial profiling through
programs certified by the Montana public safety officer standards and training
council; counseling and training of peace officers found to have engaged in racebased traffic stops within ninety days of a review; authorizing investigations into
individual peace officers’ conduct and punishments consistent with applicable
laws, rules, ordinances, or policies; periodic reports to the law and justice
interim committee; and encouraging law enforcement agencies to apply for
federal grants to purchase video camera and voice-activated microphones to be
mounted on police cars and used during traffic stops,
with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1m (West 2011) (requiring each municipal police
department to adopt a written policy prohibiting racial profiling). The Connecticut statute
also provides the following:
requiring the same to use a form developed and promulgated pursuant to the
Chief State’s Attorney in conjunction with other agencies and councils
guidelines; reports to include information about the number of persons stopped
for traffic violations, characteristics of race, the nature of the alleged violation
prompting the stop, whether a warning or citation was issued or arrest made, and
any additional information the police department deems appropriate; mandating
that a copy of each report be retained; mandating that the local law enforcement
agency receive complaints and provide both a copy of the complaint and written
notification of the review and disposition of the complaint to the Chief State’s
Attorney and the African-American Affairs Commission; providing civil
liability protection for police officers who in good faith record traffic stop
information so long as the officer’s conduct was not unreasonable or reckless;
authorizing the Secretary of the Officer of Policy and Management to order the
withholding of state funds to any police department that fails to comply with the
provisions of the statute; requiring all local police departments to provide a
summary report of all recorded information from traffic stops to the Chief
State’s Attorney and the African-American Affairs Commission; requiring the
African-American Affairs Commission to review the prevalence and disposition
of traffic stops and complaints and to report to the Governor, the General
Assembly, and also other entities as necessary.
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specifically addresses racial profiling, implementing broader reforms that
indirectly address profiling may present a reasonable alternative. Second,
even where states have enacted legislation to address racial profiling, these
laws are not immune to repeal by newly elected state legislatures. For
example, in Wisconsin, Governor Tommy Thompson created the
Governor’s Task Force on Racial Profiling to study racial profiling.125 The
Task Force found that there was anecdotal evidence of racial profiling
within Wisconsin law enforcement agencies and recommended training,
community participation, and the collection of data on traffic stops.126
After the Task Force issued the report, then-governor Scott McCallum
issued an executive order requiring “all enforcement agencies in the State
of Wisconsin to enact a policy prohibiting the practice of racial
profiling.”127
Finding that many agencies were not following the
recommendations or complying with the executive order, the Wisconsin
state legislature passed a racial profiling bill that required all Wisconsin
law-enforcement officers to begin collecting and submitting data from
traffic stops to determine “whether the number of traffic stops between
minorities and non-minorities 1) is disproportionate and 2) whether the
number of traffic stop searches between minorities and non-minorities is
disproportionate.”128
However, amid fierce opposition from lawenforcement agencies, the Wisconsin legislature quickly repealed the bill in
June 2011.129 The repeal of this state law strengthens the arguments that
federal protections are necessary to ensure sustained efforts to eradicate
racial profiling.
One recent example of how DOJ’s enforcement of its pattern or
practice authority can address racial profiling is quickly unfolding in
several communities near Los Angeles. Pursuant to its pattern or practice
125. OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, RACIAL DISPARITIES, http://oja.wi.gov/section.asp?
linkid=1344&locid=97 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
126. See STATE OF WISCONSIN GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON RACIAL PROFILING 11–19
(2000), available at http://oja.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=15466&locid=97 (last visited
Nov. 8, 2011) (describing instances of anecdotal profiling) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
127. Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the
Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 740
(2004).
128. OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTION,
http://oja.wi.gov/section.asp?linkid=1643&locid=97 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
129. Id.
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authority, DOJ recently opened an investigation into the Los Angeles
County Sherriff’s Department amid violations of racial profiling in the
communities of Lancaster and Palmdale.130 These communities have
experienced a dramatic increase in the number of African-Americans and
Latinos in recent years, many of whom live in the communities’ public
housing.131 Residents allege that city officials and police have engaged in
widespread harassment of many minorities in order to encourage them to
move from the community.132 DOJ had previously investigated whether
officials were violating the Fair Housing Act, and Assistant Attorney
General Tomas Perez recently announced that the investigation would
expand to include the Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Department, which
contracts with Palmdale and Lancaster to provide police protection.133 In
his announcement, Assistant Attorney General Perez stated that
“[DOJ officials] are analyzing arrest data in the Palmdale and Lancaster
[police] stations. These stations appear to have disproportionately high
rates of misdemeanor and obstruction arrests compared to the rest of Los
Angeles County. While the rates of felony arrests are similar to
elsewhere in the county, the two cities appear to have unusually high
rates of misdemeanor arrests, and particularly high rates of arrests of
134
African Americans.”

Depending on the outcome of DOJ’s investigation, these communities
may be required to implement reforms to not only collect data on their
traffic stops, searches, and arrests, may be mandated to implement training
and other measures to alleviate profiling.
While efforts to collect data on racial profiling should continue, the
focus must shift beyond proving racial profiling to changing the perceptions
and mending the rift between police and communities of color. The
difficulty in capturing the true extent of racial profiling makes it extremely
challenging to propose suitable remedies, but implementing widespread
130. See Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Speech at the Antelope Valley
Investigation Announcement (Feb. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
crt/opa/pr/speeches/2011/crt-speech-110819.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (noting that
“[i]n particular, we are investigating serious allegations of systematic harassment of AfricanAmerican and Latino residents of these communities, including whether certain leadership in
these communities adopted a policy or practice designed to drive certain residents out of the
community”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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internal organizational reforms advocated by police practices experts
represents a promising strategy to combat this unconstitutional and
ineffective practice.

